

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 059655

62

ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY S/P:JHKALICKI

APPROVED BY C:HSNENFELDT

S: MR. PASSAGE S/S-MR. ORTIZ

S/P:RBARTHOLOMEW

PM:GVEST

EUR:DSWARTZ

NEA/PAB:PCONSTABLE

OES:HBENGELSDORF

H:JMACKENZIE

EA:WGELYSTEEN(SUBS)

----- 096405

O 112032Z MAR 76

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

INFO AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

S E C R E T STATE 059655

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS:PARM, TECH, PK, FR

SUBJECT:PAKISTANI NUCLEAR FACILITIES

REFS: STATE 38854, 40475

FOR AMBASSADOR.

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING CONFIDENTIAL

LETTER FROM SECRETARY TO FOREIGN MINISTER SAUVAGNARGUES

AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 059655

QUOTE. DEAR JEAN:

I AM WRITING YOU ON A MATTER OF PROFOUND IMPORTANCE TO OUR EFFORTS TO PROMOTE STABILITY AND DETER THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE CAPABILITIES: THE THREAT POSED TO THOSE EFFORTS BY INCREASED NATIONAL ACCESS TO SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY -- PARTICULARLY CHEMICAL REPROCESSING FACILITIES -- ESPECIALLY IN AREAS OF CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY.

I HAVE BEEN HEARTENED BY THE PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE SINCE OUR PRESIDENTS MET IN MARTINIQUE IN 1974. THE MEETINGS OF NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS IN LONDON HAVE SUCCEEDED IN STRENGTHENING AND EXPANDING GUIDELINES FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND CONTROLS. WE TAKE VERY SERIOUSLY THEIR PROVISIONS FOR CONSULTATION, RESTRAINT IN SENSITIVE NUCLEAR EXPORTS, AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF MULTINATIONAL ALTERNATIVES TO SUCH EXPORTS. WE HAVE APPLAUDED THE ACTIVE COOPERATION OF FRANCE WHICH HAS MADE POSSIBLE THE SUCCESS OF THIS EFFORT.

I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE, AS I NOTED LAST SEPTEMBER TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THAT THE FURTHER SPREAD UNDER NATIONAL CONTROL OF REPROCESSING FACILITIES WILL SERIOUSLY AGGRAVATE THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. MY CONCERN IS ALL THE GREATER IN THE CASE OF COUNTRIES WHOSE INCENTIVES TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL. THIS IS WHY WE WELCOMED KOREA'S DECISION TO FOREGO ACQUIRING A NATIONAL REPROCESSING PLANT, AND WHY WE DEEPLY APPRECIATED FRANCE'S CONSTRUCTIVE STANCE WHICH CONTRIBUTED SO MUCH TO OUR EFFORTS. WE HAVE MADE EMPHATICALLY CLEAR TO THE KOREAN GOVERNMENT THAT FUTURE U.S. COOPERATION SHOULD NOT HAMPER OR REPLACE ITS PEACEFUL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH FRANCE.

WE ARE THEREFORE AT A JUNCTURE WHERE WE CAN MOVE TO CONSOLIDATE A PATTERN OF RESTRAINT IN SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TRANSFERS WHILE FOSTERING EFFECTIVELY SAFEGUARDED COOPERATION IN NON-SENSITIVE PARTS OF THE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE. IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT WE ARE ASKING FRANCE TO JOIN US IN AN ACT OF LEADERSHIP TO DETER OR DELAY PAKISTANI ACQUISITION OF A NATIONAL REPROCESSING CAPABILITY AND TO PURSUE, WHEN THE NEED IS CLEAR, SAFER AND MORE ECONOMIC ALTERNATIVES

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 059655

SUCH AS A MULTINATIONAL VENTURE IN THE REGION.

IN THIS CONNECTION, WE HAVE ASKED PAKISTAN TO CONSIDER CANCELLATION OF PRESENT PLANS TO ACQUIRE A REPROCESSING PLANT UNTIL ITS FUTURE NUCLEAR PROGRAM IS SUFFICIENTLY DEVELOPED TO ESTABLISH CLEAR NEED AND UNTIL OTHER ALTERNATIVES HAVE BEEN MORE THOROUGHLY EXPLORED. I EXPRESSED MY PERSONAL CONCERN ABOUT THESE PLANS TO PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO.

I MUST BE FRANK IN POINTING OUT THAT COMPARED TO KOREA, PAKISTAN IS PURSUING A MUCH LARGER PLUTONIUM-PRODUCTION CAPABILITY, FOR WHICH IT HAS NO ECONOMIC NEED BUT IT DOES HAVE CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL FOR BEING USED EITHER TO COUNTER INDIA'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OR TO TRY TO OBTAIN CONCESSIONS FOR NOT DOING SO. WE MUST ALSO FACE THE DANGER OF CONTRAVENTION OR ABROGATION OF EVEN THE MOST EFFECTIVE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT IF A NATION FINDS THIS TO BE IN ITS NATIONAL INTEREST.

- I BELIEVE THAT I UNDERSTAND THE DIFFICULTIES THAT MY REQUEST MAY PRESENT TO YOUR GOVERNMENT. WHILE I WOULD PREFER THAT FRANCE PARTICIPATE WITH US IN PERSUADING PAKISTAN TO CANCEL ITS FACILITY, IT WOULD HELP OUR EFFORTS WITH PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO IF FRANCE COULD DELAY FURTHER ACTIONS ON THIS TRANSACTION FOR A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME. I BELIEVE THAT WE CAN MAKE NO MORE ENDURING CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL STABILITY THAN A DECISIVE ACT TO FORESTALL FURTHER TRANSFERS OF NATIONAL REPROCESSING CAPABILITIES, PARTICULARLY IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL RISK THAT THEY MIGHT BE USED FOR NON-PEACEFUL PURPOSES. WARM REGARDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER. UNQUOTE. SIGNED ORIGINAL FOLLOWS IN POUCH.

2. AMBASSADOR SHOULD INFORM ELYSEE (PIERRE-BROSSOLETTE) OF U.S. DEMARCHE AND UNDERLINE TO BOTH QUAI AND ELYSEE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH USG VIEWS NATIONAL REPROCESSING TRANSACTIONS (EVEN UNDER IAEA SAFEGUARDS) TO SENSITIVE COUNTRIES SUCH AS PAKISTAN, WHICH HAS SECURITY INCENTIVES TO MATCH INDIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES AND WHICH LACKS CREDIBLE ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION FOR ACQUIRING COMPLETE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 059655

3. AMBASSADOR MAY NOTE THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER, IN MARCH 9 APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE, STRESSED IMPORTANCE USG ATTACHES TO SUPPLIER CONSULTATIONS ON SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TRANSACTIONS AND NOTED STRONG U.S. PREFERENCE FOR RESTRAINT ON SUCH TRANSACTIONS, PARTICULARLY IN CASE OF COUNTRIES SUCH AS PAKISTAN, AND U.S. SUPPORT FOR EXPLORING REGIONAL MULTINATIONAL ALTERNATIVES AS NEEDED. IN CONTEXT OF EMPHASIZING NON-PROLIFERATION AS A CENTRAL U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVE, SECRETARY EXPRESSED COMMON CONCERN OF ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS ON NEED TO CONSTRAIN SPREAD OF NATIONAL REPROCESSING AND OTHER SENSITIVE NUCLEAR FACILITIES, AND CONFIRMED U.S. POLICY OF AVOIDING EXPORT OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY.

4. FOR OTTAWA. DEPARTMENT INTENDS TO INFORM CANADIAN

EMBASSY OF SECRETARY'S LETTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER AND TO
INDICATE THAT ANY SUPPORTIVE ACTIONS CANADA MIGHT TAKE
WOULD OF COURSE BE WELCOMED. INGERSOLL

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TEXT, NUCLEAR AGREEMENTS, POLICIES, TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGES, NUCLEAR COOPERATION PROGRAMS, DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 11 MAR 1976
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: saccheem
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976STATE059655
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: JHKALICKI
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: X3
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760092-1138
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760370/aaaacjip.tel
Line Count: 172
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 76 STATE 38854
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: saccheem
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 27 OCT 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <27 OCT 2003 by GarlanWA>; APPROVED <05 AUG 2004 by saccheem>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: AKISTANI NUCLEAR FACILITIES
TAGS: PARM, TECH, PK, FR, US, (KISSINGER, HENRY A), (SAUVAGNARGUES, JEAN)
To: PARIS
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006